Confronted with recurrent macroeconomic shocks, governments in Latin America and the Caribbean have increasingly been concerned about establishing or strengthening systems of social protection and safety net programs. The goal of these programs is to help mitigate the impact on the poor of shocks before they occur, and to help the poor cope with the shocks once they have occurred. In this paper, we focus on publicly funded or mandated safety nets functioning as risk-coping mechanisms. The paper reviews the characteristics of a good safety net against the main types of safety nets currently in place. In general, it finds that no single program meets all of the criteria in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, although some are better than others. Finally, what has been the actual record in terms of protecting the poor through targeted public spending during crises? The paper finds that because of fiscal constraints during a crisis, social spending is often pro-cyclical when ideally it should be counter-cyclical. Ironically, social protection spending itself does not appear to be protected.
The context: Persistent poverty and vulnerability to shocks
The Latin America and Caribbean Region (LAC) has been plagued by macroeconomic shocks over the last twenty years, with serious consequences for the poor (e.g. Glewwe and Hall, 1998; Lustig, 1995 Lustig, , 1999 Ganuza et al., 1999) . Macroeconomic shocks are so-called "covariant" shocks (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999) which affect the real incomes of a large share of the population, typically through a reduction in both real hourly wages (via inflation) and the number of hours worked (via unemployment or underemployment) . Beyond these income effects which may vanish once growth resumes, macroeconomic shocks may also have longer term consequences. For example, the reduction in the quantity and quality of public health care due to budgetary cuts during a crisis may induce irreparable damage. Also, when coping with a crisis, parents may send their children to work in order to compensate for their own loss of income. If there is substitution between child labor and schooling, and if the children do not return to school at a later stage, they will incur long term wage losses due to their lower endowment in human capital . All this may help explain why De Janvry and Sadoulet (1999) find evidence that the increase in poverty that follows a macroeconomic shock may be larger than the subsequent reduction in poverty with growth.
There are signs that the reforms enacted in many countries of the region in the 1990s have been bearing at least some fruits. estimates that in 1996, slightly more than one third of the LAC population (36.7 percent) was poor (i.e., not able to afford basic food and non food needs), and one out of every six person (16.1 percent) was extremely poor (i.e., not able to afford basic food needs). This represents a progress versus 1992 when the incidences of poverty and extreme poverty were both higher. However, the absolute number of the poor has not been reduced as much due to population growth. Moreover, if the comparison is made with 1986 instead of 1992, the numbers of the poor and extreme poor in 1996 have risen considerably (see Lustig and Arias, 2000 , for a survey of poverty estimates). Projections of further poverty reduction between 1996 and 1998 using elasticities of poverty reduction to growth and actual levels of growth observed in LAC suggest only limited gains in percentage terms, with the numbers of the poor and extreme poor remaining constant 2 . Source: Wodon et al. (2000a) . Poverty numbers for 1998 are based on projections, not surveys.
In addition to high levels of poverty, Latin American households are affected by instability of incomes and employment. While the level of instability is often thought to be linked with current trends toward globalization, de Ferranti et al. (2000) shows that instability has not grown over time, and instability in Latin America is no worse than other developing country regions. Still, there is much more instability in Latin America than in OECD countries and openness may have resulted in widening of wage differentials between better and less skilled workers 3 . Moreover, while the current changes in labor markets should ultimately bring net positive aggregate gains, they may induce idiosyncratic (i.e., household specific) shocks for the individuals loosing their jobs at a time when the region has not yet fully developed systems of social protection.
It should not be surprising under these circumstances that there is a malaise in the region. While average levels of real per capita incomes have risen in a majority of LAC countries in the 1990s, this may not yet have been translated into improvements in subjective perceptions of welfare. Table 2 presents the results of a 1999 opinion survey conducted by the Wall Street Journal in fourteen LAC countries. Almost two thirds of the respondents believe that their parents had a better life than themselves. Less than half believe that their children will have a better life than themselves. This pessimism probably reflects both a feeling of economic insecurity and the relative lack of progress in reducing poverty observed over the last two decades and documented above. And regarding your children, do you believe that they will live better, the same, or worse than how you live today?
46.1% 20.7% 22.0% 11.2%
Source: 1999 poll, Wall Street Journal, quoted by Rodrick (1999) . NA = No answer.
There are no easy answers to the difficulties and uncertainties faced by poor households in Latin America. Macroeconomic policies promoting stable and broad-based economic growth certainly help in reducing poverty, but they are not enough. Governments in the region have increasingly been concerned about establishing or strengthening systems of social protection and safety net programs that help mitigate the potential impact of economic shocks before they occur, and help the poor cope with these shocks after they have occurred. In this paper, we focus on publicly funded or mandated safety nets functioning as risk-coping mechanisms. What are the characteristics of good public safety nets? What are the main types of safety nets currently in place in LAC countries? Which programs should be protected or expanded during economic crises? Finally, what has been the actual record in terms of protecting the poor through targeted public spending during crises? This paper provides tentative answers to these questions. Section 2 of the paper introduces the reader to the main concepts used in the literature on social protection and safety nets within the context of the various ways in which households are affected by, and respond to shocks. Section 3 presents the main types of programs currently in place, with their respective strengths and limits. Section 4 uses data on seven Latin American countries to assess the actual record in protecting the poor through safety nets during crises. A brief conclusion follows 4 .
3 A convincing body of empirical evidence is lacking on many of these issues. Lustig and Arias (2000) argue for example that there have been widening returns to skills, but Gill (1999) suggests that the empirical evidence is still very much mixed. See for example Fajnzylber and Maloney (1999) . 4 Several authors have recently reviewed the literature on social protection, safety nets, and crises. This includes among others Klugman (1999) for safety nets, Dar and Tzannatos (1999) for active labor market programs, Karni (1999) for unemployment insurance, and Ezemenari and Subbarao (1999) for social assistance. The Inter-American Development Bank (in February 1999) and the World Bank (in June 1999) have held conferences on the topics. For a discussion of social protection within the context of globalization, see also de Ferranti et al. (2000) .
The goal: Designing good safety nets and social protection systems
A recently drafted World Bank Social Protection Strategy Paper (World Bank, 1999a; see also Holzmann and Jorgenson, 1999) places social protection in the context of social risk management. It makes the point of dividing social risk management strategies into three types: risk reduction, risk mitigation and risk coping. Under risk reduction fall macro economic management, regulations, and institutional development policies that help prevent crises from occurring. While these prevention policies are important, they are too general to be part of the social protection system which consists mainly of mitigation and coping strategies. Risk mitigation strategies are developed before a shock to reduce the impact of the shock once it occurs. They include for example income diversification and insurance mechanisms, both formal and informal. Risk coping strategies are implemented after a shock to deal with the impacts of the shock not covered by risk mitigation policies. Table 3 from Gill (1999) provides an overview of some of the main government and private sector policies. Gill (1999) .
In this paper, we focus on publicly provided or mandated instruments for assisting private individuals in coping with shocks (the bottom cell in the middle column in Table 3 ). This does not mean that we do not take into account private coping strategies 5 . There are of course linkages between private and public coping strategies (see e.g. Ezemenari, 1997, for transfers) . As mentioned in the introduction, some private short-term strategies may have permanent effects that make it difficult to reduce poverty in the longer term. This is the case when the nutrition of certain family members suffers. It is also the case if children are 5 To cope with the income losses induced by shocks, the poor adopt a wide variety of coping strategies. These may include moving from formal to informal sector employment; working longer hours and/or working at a second job; promoting the labor force participation of additional family members such as spouses and children; selling (or consuming in the case of farmers) productive and other assets, including stocks; migrating temporarily or permanently in order to search for employment opportunities; reducing consumption patterns, including restricting the food intake of family members, taking children out to school to reduce education expenditures, or postponing health care expenditures; relocating and/or restructuring households, for example by having several families living under one roof; drawing on outside help both in kind and in cash, including support from local communities, friends and relatives, and private institutions such as NGOs (this in turn highlights the role of social capital). One interesting paper about the gender dimension of these strategies is Cunningham (1998). removed from school and are put to work 6 . More generally, publicly funded or mandated social protection programs and safety nets represent an attempt to protect the poor against the risks that arise from shocks, whether the shocks are foreign or domestically induced, and whether they are covariant or idiosyncratic. As already mentioned, an economic crisis produces a covariant shock , whereby many people are affected at the same time. But even in normal times, households can be affected by idiosyncratic shocks such as a death, an illness, or a loss of employment. One should differentiate between the social safety nets which should be in place at all times to deal with idiosyncratic shocks, and the programs which are specifically designed to help large numbers of poor people suffering from temporary adverse covariant shocks (World Bank, 1999a ).
There are typically more mechanisms available for coping with idiosyncratic as opposed to covariant shocks, and the fiscal implications of both types of shocks are clearly different. However, even among the programs designed to deal with covariant shocks, one can identify a number of alternatives. These include:
? ? Emergency employment programs involving public works, often using labor intensive methods, commonly called workfare; ? ? Social funds, which establish special programs, usually in rural areas, for financing small scale public works identified by local community groups; ? ? Nutrition and food interventions, particularly those targeted at vulnerable groups such as children and pregnant women. These may take many forms, including food distributions, food stamps, and food served in schools or community kitchens; ? ? Systems of direct cash grants targeted to the poorest, which may be conditioned on favorable behavior (such as school attendance and/or health center visits); ? ? Other instruments, such as pensions and unemployment insurance, including systems of mandatory severance payments upon termination.
Another way to organize the discussion is to look at the programs in terms of the age groups they serve, on the basis of the fact that the different age groups have different needs.
7
People in the youngest age groups generally are at greater nutritional risk than other groups, while for adults, the principal problem may be one of employment. For the elderly, the critical problems are maintaining sufficient income to meet basic needs, and to have adequate health care access.
Within Latin America and the Caribbean, at present almost all countries have some mix of the above programs in varying degrees. However, very few if any programs completely fulfill the criteria of an ideal safety net which should have the following characteristics 8 :
6 Although the substitution effects between work and schooling are likely to be partial due to the possibility for the parents to reduce the time devoted by the children to leisure (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000a) , it has been estimated that on average, for six Latin American countries, the reduction in the probability of going to school when a child is performing paid work varies from 21 to 67 percent depending on the sample ; the estimates include controls for a wide range of other variables affecting the decision to go to school and/or to work, so that they are net marginal effects). This substitution between work and schooling reduces the human capital endowment of working children to the extent that working children may expect on average a loss of about 7 percent of their discounted life-time earnings when they are put to work even after taking into account their positive earnings when working as children and the higher level of experience accumulated because of work at an early age. Clearly, the magnitude of the long term losses due to child labor calls for the design of programs that help parents keep their children in school, especially during economic crises. 7 This idea comes from Ana-Maria Arriagada, See Appendix table for details. 8 For a fuller discussion of criteria see Grosh (1995 
3.
The tools: Types of safety nets and social protection programs
Workfare programs
Workfare programs provide employment through specifically designed public works projects. The classic example is Trabajar in Argentina. In this program, projects are identified by local governments, NGOs and community groups, and can provide employment for no more than 100 days per participant. Project proposals are reviewed by a regional committee, and projects with higher poverty and employment impacts are favored 9 . Workers hired by the project are paid by the Government, specifically the Ministry of Labor. The other costs are financed by local authorities. Example of eligible projects include the construction or repair of schools, health facilities, basic sanitation facilities, small roads and bridges, community kitchens and centers, and small dams and canals 10 The projects financed by Trabajar are limited to poor areas as identified by a poverty map. Moreover, wages are set to be no higher than 90 percent of the prevailing market wage, so that the workers have an incentive to return to private sector jobs when these are available. Thus, the program involves self targeting apart from geographic targeting. Overall, targeting 9 In a recent reform of Trabajar, several steps were taken to improve the performance of the program. The focus of the reform was placed on increasing community participation and funding in the choice of the projects to be financed. Trabajar now works in collaboration with local community groups, NGOs, and municipalities who present projects for selection. Projects must first be approved for technical feasibility. Next, they are selected on a points basis. More points are awarded to projects located in poorer areas, yielding larger public benefits, benefiting from well-regarded sponsoring community groups or NGOs, and reducing labor costs below the minimum wage. These new features have improved targeting both at the geographic and individual levels. The involvement of local groups has also improved the quality of monitoring and feedback for the projects. 10 These activities are fairly similar to those financed by social funds (see below). One of the differences between a social fund project and a workfare project is that the workfare project is likely to be supervised by local authorities, rather than by independent agencies, and construction is typically not contracted to the private sector, but is carried out by the sponsoring agency, which can include local and provincial governments, private groups, and national organizations. Another difference is that workfare programs have the generation of employment and income as their priority, while social funds focus more on the quality of the infrastructure produced. of the poor under Trabajar II (the second round of the project) has been reported to be quite good, with 75 percent of the funds reaching the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution, and 40 percent reaching the bottom 5 percent. However, the supply of jobs in the program depends on budgetary allocations as well as the ability of local communities to identify viable projects. As good as it is, Trabajar has provided employment to no more than 1 or 2 percent of the labor force, at a time when unemployment has ranged from 13 to 18 percent of the labor force.
Large workfare program have also been implemented by the Government of Chile during the period 1975-88. The objective of these programs was to absorb workers displaced from the public sector, and to reduce unemployment during the adjustment period. As for Trabajar, these programs provided employment in emergency public works, including maintenance and repairs to roads and schools, construction of parks, forestry projects, etc. The programs were administered by municipalities, and were gradually built up to a peak in 1983, when they employed about 13 percent of the total work force (over 500,000 workers), while the unemployment rate was at 17 percent. The programs were gradually reduced as private sector employment increased, and finally phased out completely in 1988. The two largest programs offered manual labor at very low wages to ensure self targeting. Most of the workers were unskilled, and they received one-fourth of the then current minimum wage (about onehalf of the market wage). One out of every four participant was a women. However, while the program was considered successful in terms of reducing poverty and the social impact of unemployment, the quality of the public works produced was notably low, particularly as the program expanded in size. In addition, it is not clear that all the workers in the program would have been unemployed without the program. An evaluation found that 32 percent of the participants had no work experience prior to participating in the program, and 46 percent had retired voluntarily before joining the program. Many of those with no experience were women who went to work for the first time (Universidad de Chile, 1992).
The advantages of workfare programs include their ability to expand quickly during a crisis, once the basic mechanisms have been established, and to reach the poor through area targeting and, within poor areas, through self targeting thanks to the low wages. But a problem with these programs is that the cost of generating one dollar in additional income for the poor through public works is typically large, in the range of three dolla rs or more. To understand why, the measure of cost effectiveness and its decomposition proposed in Box 1 are useful.
The measure of cost effectiveness used is the share of total program costs which reaches the poor through net increases in earnings. Modifying slightly the formula provided in Ravallion (1999) , as indicated in Box 1, this share can be thought as being a function of four key parameters: the proportionate wage gain, the targeting performance, the wage share, and the budget leverage. A reasonable value for the proportionate wage gain may be 0.5 because the workfare wages are low and the poor typically find some other way to generate resources, for example through part-time informal employment when they do not have access to the programs. Because of the self-selection involved and the priorities given to poor areas, targeting performance may be good, at about 0.8. The wage share can often be obtained from administrative records by multiplying the number of work days created by the program by the wage rate, and dividing this amount by the total cost of the program. In many cases, the wage share will not exceed 0.7. Finally, when the program is almost entirely financed by the federal state (even though project selection may be done at the local level), the budget leverage is equal to one (in the case of Trabajar, there is budget leverage, but while this saves money for the central government, it still has to be paid by local governments). The measure of cost effectiveness is obtained by multiply ing the various parameters 11 . It thus typically costs three or more dollars to the national or federal government to transfer one dollar to the poor in additional wages.
BOX 1: MEASURING THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC WORKS
In the spirit of Ravallion (1999) , assume that without public works, an individual has a probability F* to find employment at market wage W*. Expected earnings are F*W*. With public works, the individual earns the public works wage W. If the individual can continue to search for private or self-employment while participating in public works, with probability F of finding such employment, the expected wage with public works is FW*+(1-F)W. The net wage benefit from the program for the worker is NWB = (1-F)W -(F* -F)W*. If the worker gets unemployment benefits or a subsistence allowance S, the wage benefit is reduced to NWB = (1-F)W -(F* -F)W* -(1-F*)S. If the program costs G to the Government per worker employed, a measure of cost effectiveness is the share of public expenditures transferred to workers as wage gain NWB/G. This measure can be decomposed as follows:
budget wage targeting proportionate leverage share performance wage gain
The determinants of cost-effectiveness are a) the leverage ratio C/G, where C is the total cost per worker including community funding; b) the wage share (W+L)/C, where W stands for wages paid to the poor and L stands for leakage due to wages paid for the non-poor; c) the targeting performance W/(W+L) which is the percentage of wages reaching the poor; and d) the proportionate wage gain NWB/W. This model can be extended to take into account the benefits of the infrastructure built by public works, but these benefits are not as immediate (see Wodon, 2000b for a model and a discussion).
The notion that it costs three or more dollars to transfer one dolla r of income to the poor through workfare could be challenged, in that the benefits could be higher for two reasons 12 :
? ? First, the method presented in Box 1 does not take into account the benefits of the public works themselves, which can be substantial if the workers are put to good use. The problem, however, is that these benefits will be enjoyed during the whole life of the infrastructure built, while what the poor need in times of crises is immediate income support. If the poor have high discount rates (which they do in general, but especially in times of crisis when their resources do not provide for basic subsistence), the discounted value of the benefits generated by the public works may be quite low. Moreover, since the emphasis is on job creation rather than investments, there may be a bias toward "make work" or prestige projects that may not be highly valuable. This may be particularly true in a crisis, when a rapid expansion of the program exhausts the backlog of viable projects. ? ? Second, the method presented in Box 1 assumes that only the net proportionate wage gain must be taken into account for measuring the program's impact. But in periods of high unemployment, it could be argued that at least part of the difference 11 In our illustrative examples, this measure would be equal to 0.5*0.8*0.7=0.28, in which case the total cost of generating one dollar in net additional wage earnings for program participants is 1/0.28=3.6 dollars. For an example of the econometric methods that can be used to measure with some precision the net wage benefit of workfare programs using household surveys (i.e. the parameter NWB/W), see Jalan and Ravallion (1998) . 12 For a fuller discussion of these points, see Wodon (2000b) and .
between the public works wage and what the program participant would have earned by himself without the program will be available as earnings for another worker who does not participate in the program and who is also underemployed. At the extreme, the whole wage rate could be taken into account in the cost-benefit analysis, which would greatly enhance the cost-effectiveness of such programs.
On the other hand, arguments could also be put forward to argue that the net transfers to the poor are lower than predicted by the decomposition in Box 5. For example:
? ? First, since workers are paid by local authorities, the opportunities for corruption and political bias are more pronounced. With Trabajar, there remains some evidence of political influences in the choice of participants and gender discrimination (few women are selected in some areas). ? ? Second, the poorest communities may not always be well positioned to submit proposals for projects and/or to contribute to non-wage costs. In this case, the targeting performance of the program m ay suffer, because the contribution of geographic targeting to overall targeting performance will be reduced.
Apart from Argentina and Chile, the experience of Mexico is also valuable for the assessment of the strengths and limits of workfare programs. Mexico's rural areas the Programa de Empleo Temporal (PET) provides off-season temporary employment below minimum wage through public works. Employment is for up to 88 working days at 90 percent of the minimum wage. In 1999, 93 million work days and one million jobs were to be created. PET is an example of a program which functions in normal times rather than only during crisis, although it is restricted to certain periods of the year only. As expected, the projects are labor intensive. Examples include i rrigating land, paving roads, clearing land, improving housing, and installing water and sewerage systems. The data suggests good targeting, with the participants being poor and needing the temporary jobs more than non-participants because they do not benefit from occupations that keep them employed all year long. Yet, the program does not reach the smallest (and probably poorest) rural communities. On average, PET communities are almost twice as large as non-PET communities. PET communities have better access than non-PET communities to electricity (74 versus 60 percent), public phones (33 versus 19 percent), pre-schools (81 versus 67 percent), primary schools (89 versus 82 percent), and tele -secondary schools (22 versus 11 percent). Part of the problem may be due to the higher (e.g., administrative) cost of reaching very small rural communities.
One might also consider job training programs as a safety net, particularly if they can be modified during a time of crisis. In Mexico, the Probecat program was implemented in 1986 as a response to the growth in unemployment that followed the 1982 debt crisis and the subsequent structural adjustment policies. Today, the program provides training to close to 500,000 beneficiaries per year in urban areas. A new evaluation of the program suggests however that it does not have a statistically significant impact on employment and wages (Wodon and Minowa, 1999; see Revenga et al., 1984 and STPS, 1998 , for previous evaluations). These disappointing results are not that surprising, because most retraining programs in OECD countries have been found to have limited impacts. One reason for this may be that the training is provided for too short a period of time (a few months) in order to provide skills valuable in the long run. Some job training programs may in fact function as safety nets by providing temporary relief for the unemployed with a self-targeting mechanism not unlike that of public works programs since participants typically receive only the minimum wage. It is probably better to choose one goal or the other (training versus social protection), rather than trying to meet both goals with a single program.
Social investment funds
Social investment funds (SIFs) were the original World Bank response to the social aspects of adjustment programs, and some of the earliest funds (e.g., Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund created in 1991) were designed primarily to provide employment (Jorgensen, Grosh and Shacter, 1992) . In fact, SIFs were started in part to avoid the problems associated with emergency public works (workfare) programs. Yet almost all SIFs now have evolved into programs designed to provide small scale social and infrastructure, particularly in rural and poor areas, using projects generated and executed at the local level. Therefore, social funds are not safety nets per se. Note that unlike workfare programs, some social funds also finance programs that do not involve construction or maintenance, such as nutrition programs, technical assistance and micro credit. When construction work is involved, it is not rare to see social funds using a skilled manpower paid at market wages. This is because the quality of the infrastructure built is considered as more important than the provision of employment for the poor. This is the case with the Honduras social fund which originated from the transformation of an employment generation program in the early 1990s but does not consider the objective of employment creation as its main priority nowadays. On the other hand, most social funds are usually targeted to poor areas through the use of a poverty map (or, in some cases, through the use of a map of unmet basic needs).
While both workfare and social fund programs build projects in the public sector, there are important differences. The social fund finances the material and labor costs of a project, although some local labor may be donated as a community contribution. This varies across SIFs and countries. A workfare program generally finances the labor cost of a project at the national or federal level, and asks that local governments or agencies provide for the material costs. Thus, there is a clear incentive in workfare programs for the local agency to find labor intensive methods of construction, and choose labor intensive projects. Since SIF projects are bid out to the private sector, often the most modern and capital intensive construction methods are used, although in some cases social funds specify minimum employment levels to be attained in their operations.
Most social funds are agencies independent of line Ministries, often attached to the office of the country's President, which reviews and funds projects submitted by NGOs, local governments and other sponsoring agents. Their strong points include l ocal community involvement and the ability to respond to local perceptions of needs, especially in rural areas where normal government expenditures often do not reach the poor. Social funds also have a better ability to avoid corruption and "make work" pr ojects. But they are not very good at providing safety nets, and they do not normally expand during a crisis to provide more employment. In fact, the amount of employment and income generation provided by social funds has historically been low. For instance, a review of social funds found that for 10 major social funds provided employment on average equal to only 4 percent of the labor force (Goodman et al., 1997) . Likewise, the monetary contribution of wages was judged to be small, as well as the poverty reduction impact coming from the projects themselves. Social funds are better at improving the supply of health, education, and basic infrastructure services, with in some cases impacts on outcomes such as school enrollment rates, age-for-grade, or the inc idence of illnesses (recent evaluations using household level data include Pradhan et. al, 1998, for Bolivia, and ESA Consultores, 1999 , for Honduras).
Still, one of the clear advantages of social funds is that they have strong organizations that exist with relatively good systems for project management and monitoring. These organizations can be used in times of crisis for the delivery of social safety nets. The existing social fund in Honduras, for instance, has proven highly valuable in directing emergency assistance to local villages after Hurricane Mitch. One possibility therefore is to work with social investment funds to modify their operations during a crisis, such as by putting more emphasis on labor intensive projects, and by having the fund involved in new, hard hit areas. It is thus a good idea to identify labor intensive projects in advance of a potential crisis, so that these are ready for funding should a crisis come about
Nutrition and food programs
Nutrition and food programs take a variety of forms. Subbarao et al. (1997) have identified about thirty countries using food policies with redistributive aims. Among these countries, price subsidies are used as often as feeding programs and food for work requirements, and much more often than food quantity rationing and food stamps. In fact, many workfare programs now providing wages in cash initially started as "food-for-work" programs. As for direct feeding programs, they provide food to needy recipients, through direct delivery of unprepared foods from a program warehouse, delivery of prepared food from a community kitchen, or the provision of a lunch or breakfast to children in school 13 . Evaluations of nutrition programs generally indicate that there is only a small, marginal improvement in nutrition compared to the case where the family receives an equivalent cash grant. This is because families may substitute free food for their own purchases, and largely use the savings for other purposes. However, even if a food program is roughly equivalent in effect to a cash grant, there are fewer possibilities of diversion of funds, since food is less likely to be misappropriated than cash. In addition, food is more likely to go to women, and be used to improve the welfare of the family, while cash is more likely to be used by men for lower priority activities. An intermediate alternative between cash and food are food stamps. Food stamps have the added benefit of not requiring a complicated system of storage and transport of food, while making use of the already existing private food distribution network. In Honduras, the food stamp program used to also cover medicines and school books. In Jamaica, the food stamp program was introduced in place of general food subsidies, and has proven effective in raising the incomes of the poor (Grosh, 1992) .
A common way of targeting food programs is by linking distribution to a health program, particularly maternal and child health care. In this way, the food serves as an incentive to attend the program, and nutrition education can help improve the use of the food given out. As already mentioned, giving food to women also lessens the possibilities of it being diverted for sale in the market. Food programs also can be designed to be self targeted, if the food products given out are those consumed by the poor and not by the middle class. Alternatively, food distribution can take place at centers located in poor neighborhoods. Such approaches can reduce the administrative burden of targeting programs, but they increase the possibility of leakage to the non-poor. School lunch and breakfast programs are also difficult to target at the individual level if one is to avoid stigmatizing some students within the school as being "poor." In many countries, schools from poor areas are targeted, but completely untargeted national programs are also common. One benefit of these programs is the incentive given to keep the children in school in order to have them fed, and to improve their learning abilities while in school (see Wodon and Siaens, 1999a , for an evaluation of the Mexican school breakfast program). From a nutrition point of view, the prime beneficiaries of the programs can however be other members of the family, if the children are not fed at home because the parents know that they will receive a school lunch.
Food subsidies are another way to help the poor by reducing the cost of their consumption bundle (Besley and Kanbur, 1988) . Means-tested food subsidies tend to be more effective than other subsidies in reducing inequality and improving welfare. For Mexico for example, Wodon and Siaens (1999b) suggest that universal subsidies do not perform well for the reduction of inequality and the improvement of welfare. They compare three programs: the now defunct universal subsidy on Tortilla, a program providing one kilo of free tortilla for households with income below two minimum wages, and a program of subsidized milk, also means-tested. Their main results were as follows: ?? Food subsidies are better than non-food subsidies. Subsidies for basic consumption goods such as tortilla reduced inequality, especially in urban areas, and more so than subsidies for utilities such as water and electricity. However, food subsidies generate price distortions and they are costly. Furthermore, a universal subsidy on tortilla is less effective than would be a similar generalized subsidy for the ingredients needed for making tortilla, such as corn flour. ?? Within food subsidies, means-tested subsidies are better than universal subsidies. The marginal impact on inequality and welfare achieved with the universal tortilla subsidies does not come close to the welfare gains achieved with the means-tested subsidies.
Still, food subsidies may not represent a sound and cost-effective investment for poverty reduction. Food subsidies and distribution systems can have negative incentive effects on the supply of labor (Sahn and Alderman, 1995) . They can be badly targeted, with high leakage among the non-poor (Grosh, 1994; Cornia and Stewart, 1995) . And, while selftargeting can be achieved to some extent by subsidizing goods consumed in larger quantities by the poor than by the non-poor, this is no panacea (Tuck and Lindert, 1996) . There has been therefore a tendency to reduce funding for food subsidies in order to fund other programs, for example in Mexico (Levy and Davila, 1998) .
Conditional cash transfers
Since food is fungible with money, one could argue that cash grants are the simplest and most direct way of providing safety net assistance. The use of cash grant also avoids the utility losses associated with in-kind support. In developed countries, and some advanced Latin American countries, cash payments to selected households are slowly becoming more common. Unconditional cash payments and similar forms of social assistance are usually targeted to women with dependant children, the disabled, the aged, and those unable to work. However, the problems of targeting and controlling cash payments makes this approach problematic in the poorer countries that lack good administrative arrangement. For instance, in Bolivia, the Bonosol program provided once a year cash grant equal to four weeks pay at the minimum wage to adult citizens. The attractiveness of the grant and the lack of screening or identification mechanisms resulted in widespread abuses, including double payments and payments to non-Bolivians.
An attractive alternative is to link cash grants with school attendance or other desirable behavior. This has been introduced in various degrees in such countries as Brazil (Bolsa Escola), Argentina (Beca Secundaria), Mexico (Progressa), and Honduras (PRAF), among others 14 . These programs are not safety nets properly speaking, or at least, they were not originally designed to function as compensatory safety nets during crises. Yet the programs do provide valuable benefits which households can rely upon during crises, and these benefits can be increased during a recession if need be. In other words, as was the case for job training programs and social investment funds, existing programs providing conditional cash transfers can be expanded and modified to serve as safety nets during a crisis. In general however, school related grants will offer only a partial response to crisis situations, if only because the programs are targeted to families with children already in school, so that some of the poorest who cannot afford to send their children to school are excluded from the programs' coverage.
School-based conditional cash transfers programs reduce the opportunity costs for poor parents of keeping their children in school. This opportunity cost is essentially the loss in child wages or in the value for the parents of the domestic work done by the children which cannot be enjoyed when the children go to school. In many cases, this opportunity cost of schooling is difficult to estimate, and it is not obvious that the grants must be equal to the opportunity cost for the parents to send their children to school (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000a) . Indeed, it is reasonable to think that the parents have an intrinsic interest in having their children go to school, either for altruistic motives, or for the future benefits that intergenerational transfers provide once the children reach adulthood. In some countries however, the level of the conditional grants appears to be high. For Progresa in Mexico for example, to justify the relatively high level of the Progresa grants, it has been argued that apart from providing incentives to accumulate human capital, they also improve the families' overall quality of life. Yet there may be more cost effective ways to improve the quality of life of the program's beneficiaries. On the other hand, as shown by Wodon, Gonzalez, and Siaens (2000) , when the value of the grants is low, demand-side schooling interventions may exclude the poorest. More work is needed to measure the many trade-offs involved.
At what level of schooling should the grants be provided? This will depend on the characteristics of the country. In Brazil and Argentina, the programs focus on secondary school, since these are the children that are more likely to be pulled out of school during a crisis. In Honduras, the program focuses on the first four years of primary school. In Mexico, the program covers the end of primary schooling, and the lower secondary school cycle. In Venezuela, the program covers primary school children. In some cases, these programs are tied not only to attendance, but also to school performance, including passing on to the next grade. While this may provide valuable incentives, one has to make sure that such conditions do not exclude the poorest which may have more difficulties in succeeding at school.
How should the grants be targeted? The experience Progresa is interesting (Skoufias et al., 1999) . The program uses a three stage targeting mechanism. First, poor rural localities are selected for participation. Next, poor families are selected within participating communities using a multivariate discriminant a nalysis. Third, local communities may review the Progresa's selection staff and reclassify poor families as non-poor and vice versa. This targeting mechanism is basically sound, and the results appear to be good. One concern is that the level of community involvement remains marginal. The targeting process is centralized in part due to the desire to avoid political interference in the choice of beneficiaries. Nevertheless, more efforts could be put to promote the role of communities in targeting. Another related question relates to the need for targeting within poor communities. The higher the proportion of the poor in a community, the less the need to target within that community, especially if targeting is costly not so much administratively, but rather in terms of social cohesion (those who do not get the program may envy those who benefit from it). In Honduras, where the PRAF program is being modified in part on the basis of Progresa's experience, it has been decided to provide support to all the families residing in the poor communities that participate 15 .
Conditional cash transfer programs can also be used to promote good health practices, including the consultation of local health providers. This is again the case with Mexico's Progresa where eligible families receive a transfer (both in cash and in kind through a nutritional supplement) for health purposes apart from the transfers related to schooling. That is, Progresa aims at providing a coordinated intervention for education, health, and nutrit ion, with the hope that the impact of the whole program will be larger than that of its individual parts. Of course, with Progresa as with the other programs, in maximizing the impact of the school-and/or health-based interventions, it is important to take care of supply side issues. For example, Progresa has been successful in raising school enrollment and attendance at health care centers, but this has led to tensions on the supply side. Steps have been taken to coordinate Progresa's action with that of other Ministries, such as the Ministries of Education and Health, but more may be needed to optimize demand and supply side interventions.
Other programs
There are several other types of social protection programs that exist, including pensions for the elderly. Because many of the poor belong to the informal sector, they do not have access to the pensions provided by social security systems (similarly, those in the informal sector often lack access to other state organized benefits such as low income housing). A discussion of pension issues for the poor is provided in .
Unemployment insurance is common to Europe and North America, but relatively rare in Latin America, in part because of its high cost. On the other hand, the current labor legislation in many LAC countries mandates a severance payment on termination that is a function of the number of years worked. Normally, this is about one month's salary for every year of service, up to some maximum. This may be supplemented by an unemployment insurance scheme (as in Argentina, Brazil for formal sector workers) in which monthly contributions from payrolls and/or the employer entitles the worker to a monthly payment over a limited time horizon, with the payment set low enough to reduce disincentive effects. But since the formal sector in many countries is less than half of the total work force, the coverage of unemployment insurance/severance payments is far from complete, and the exclusion of the informal and rural sectors means that these mechanisms miss those areas containing many of the poor. Moving from a severance pay system to an unemployment insurance system could be beneficial if it reduces labor costs. However, unemployment insurance can also create moral hazard problems by subsidizing unemployment (as compared to workfare programs, which subsidize employment). One important element here is to ensure that unemployment benefits are not so generous as to discourage job search. For this, both the level of the payments and the length of time workers can receive benefits must be monitored (for a review of OECD experience with labor market rigidities and unemployment insurance, see Nickell, 1997) .
4.
The constraints: Fiscal space and administrative capacity
Are social protection programs counter-cyclical?
15 It is important when feasible to use distributional weights in the evaluation of the targeting of social programs and other interventions. For such an analysis, see for example Ravallion and Wodon (2000b) , and Wodon and Yitzhaki (2000) .
Good social protection programs should expand during an economic crisis as unemployment grows and income levels decline. In other words, the programs should be counter-cyclical in nature, i.e. rising when the economy falls. In some countries, the system of safety nets is supported by automatic entitlements that force the public sector to spend more on those who need it. For instance, unemployment causes an increase in the numbers eligible for unemployment benefits, and declining incomes can increase the number of households eligible to receive cash or food assistance. But in most Latin American countries, there are no such automatic triggers. This is in part because the need to have counter-cyclical social protection programs can conflict with the need to impose fiscal austerity during a recession. An economic crisis, whether domestically or externally induced, leads to a drop in output, and consequently in a fall in government revenues. But during a crisis, governments are reluctant to raise taxes. Thus maintaining high expenditure levels can then lead to large budget deficits.
Consider the data presented in Table 4 . Both Argentina and Mexico suffered an adverse shock in 1995 (Mexico was first, Argentina followed). Per capita GDP in Argentina decreased by 5.32 percent between 1994 and 1995, while it decreased by 4.93 percent in Mexico between 1994 and 1996. The share of GDP devoted to targeted social spending decreased a bit in the two countries. The poverty rate increased in the two countries, leading to an increase in the total number of poor people. The targeted spending per poor person decreased much more than per capita GDP, yielding an elasticity to growth (in this case to a recession) of targeted spending per poor person of about five in the two countries. During this recession, spending for the poor was thus highly pro-cyclical, while ideally it should have been counter-cyclical in order to protect the poor from the adverse macroeconomic shock. Source: Wodon, Hicks, Ryan, and Gonzalez (1999) . The data for the two countries are not strictly comparable.
Hence it should not be inferred that social protection spending is more pro-cyclical in one country than in the other. Note also that the Government of Mexico has made a substantial effort for increasing targeted funding for the poor in recent year, for example by providing funding for Progresa. This is not reflected above.
The data provided in Table 4 is based on one period in two countries only and a number of assumptions for both the estimation of poverty and the categorization of social spending. It may be misleading to conclude that social protection declines in all countries during a crisis. Unfortunately, beyond point estimates of the elasticities of targeted spending to growth such as those presented in Table 4 , the extent to which LAC countries have provided countercyclical social protection is a question which has received surprisingly little attention. One problem is that the data on budget expenditures do not typically identify social protection or safety nets as a separate activity. Social protection programs are scattered in various sectors such as health, education, social security, and welfare. However, in some countries there is data available. Wodon, Hicks, Ryan and Gonzalez (2000) use data for seven countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Panama) to test for the business cycle properties of targeted and social spending in Latin America. They first propose a theoretical model to analyze how targeted public spending for the poor may be affected by booms and bust. A Government is said to be pro-poor if it places a reasonable weight on the poor in its social welfare function, if it considers a minimum level of basic needs that must be satisfied for the poor, if it raises over time this level of basic needs faster than GDP during a period of growth, and if it does not reduce the level of minimum basic needs during a temporary recession. If a Government is pro-poor according t o the above definition, the elasticity of targeted public spending to growth will be positive and larger than one during booms, and smaller than one during recessions. If the Government is not pro-poor, the model predicts that the elasticity of targeted spending will always be smaller or equal to one. The existence of an asymmetry between booms and busts in the elasticity to growth of targeted public spending for the poor when the Government is pro-poor is then tested with the panel data on public expenditures. The results in Table 5 suggest that Governments are to some extent pro-poor and pro-social because targeted and social expenditures are rising faster than GDP and total Government spending during booms. While this is encouraging, it remains that during recessions, targeted spending is not protected. It decreases slightly faster than GDP (although the elasticities are not statistically different from one in Table 5 in the case of a recession). Thus, even though Governments can be considered as being pro-poor, targeted and social spending remain highly pro-cyclical. The evidence suggests that social protection programs, instead of expanding quickly during a crisis, actually are contracting in many cases as rapidly as other types of public spending 16 . Source: Adapted from Wodon, Hicks, Ryan, and Gonzalez (2000) . Sample of 7 countries, with 97 observations. (*) denotes an elasticity statistically different from one at the 5 percent level.
The impact of a recession on targeted spending for the poor is even more negative than suggested in Table 5 . It can be shown that in Latin America, a one percentage point decrease in per capita GDP leads to at least a two percentage point decrease in targeted public spending per poor person. Half of this impact is due to the reduction in per capita GDP itself, which reduces spending even when the share of targeted spending in GDP remains constant (the fact that the share remains constant is evidenced by the unit elasticity in Table 5 ). The other half of the impact comes from the increase in poverty due to the crisis, i.e. the available targeted public spending must be shared among a larger number of poor people.
The fact that targeted programs for the poor are not well protected may be surprising given that these programs represent a small proportion of GDP (typically 2 percent or less), and a small proportion of total spending as well. One reason for the lack of protection for targeted spending may be related to the lack of bargaining power of the poor. Another reason for why expenditure protection may be difficult during an economic and fiscal crisis is that the country must honor its debt service and a number of entitlement programs, with consequently low levels of discretionary resources. Said differently, if 30 percent of the budget is protected because of its safety net and poverty aspects, and 50 percent is for debt service and other programs that cannot be cut, a 10 percent reduction in overall spending would produce a 50 percent cut in the remaining sectors. Given that the remaining sectors might include such sensitive areas as defense, justice and administration, this may not be a feasible solution, thereby forcing the Government to abandon the idea of protecting funding for key social protection programs. One message from this discussion is that prevention before a crisis is crucial, because during the crisis, it will always be difficult to protect the poor.
How can one select the programs to be protected or expanded during a crisis?
The objective during a crisis should be first to agree that key programs that benefit the poor will not be cut back even though total government expenditures may be reduced. Next comes the difficult question of which specific programs should be protected or even expanded. It is tempting to put on the list almost all programs in basic health, education and nutrition. But not all programs in the social sectors are equally effective in reducing poverty, and some programs producing long-term benefits for the poor may be deferrable. In deciding which programs to keep and expand during a crisis, an important criteria should be the costeffectiveness of the program in quickly channeling income or its equivalent in kind to the poor. As suggested in the case of workfare programs, the cost-effectiveness of programs depends on a number of parameters. Knowing these parameters before hand helps in making a selection. The comparison of the cost-effectiveness of alternative safety nets in smoothing consumption patterns for the poor via income generation, in kind commodity distributions or commodity subsidies is one area where additional analytical work should clearly be done.
One element of a viable strategy -actually, one of the key parameters of the cost effectiveness of safety nets --, is to protect programs that have good targeting mechanisms for reaching the poor. Untargeted or universal welfare programs are often fiscally impossible to sustain, particularly during a crisis. It is true that targeting beneficiaries by complicated means testing, i.e. intensive questioning over income and wealth, can be costly and not very reliable. This is why many World Bank funded programs have relied on geographic targeting even though this can lead to substantial leakage. But an alternative approach is the proxy means test, whereby likely recipients are interviewed and respond to questions concerning their living conditions, such as the type of housing in which they live, the availability of water, the types of appliances possessed by the household, etc. Wodon (1997) has shown that these indicators are powerful for avoiding the two types of errors that can be committed in targeting, namely identifying as poor a non poor household, and as non poor a poor household. For any given budget, good targeting also helps for improving coverage among the poor (i.e., what percentage of the poor actually receive program benefits), which is an important advantage in Latin America where coverage has often been low.
Variants of means-testing systems have been used, among others, for the Fischa CAS in Chile, SISBEN in Colombia, SISFAM in Argentina, and Progresa in Mexico. In practice, people who apply for assistance are interviewed, and the score on the questionnaire determines eligibility. The weights for the various indicators included in the questionaire are based on estimated econometric relationships between the poverty status of a representative sample of households and their indicators. Grosh (1994) has estimated that the cost of targeting trough proxy-means testing or geographic targeting (poor areas) need not be much higher than the cost of universal distribution (a reasonable mark-up would be 3 to 8 percent), while producing substantial benefits. In a sample of untargeted programs, only 33 percent of the benefits accrued to the lowest 40 percent of the population, whereas targeted programs had 72 percent of their benefits reaching that population.
Beyond the need to protect the consumption of the poor during a crisis, it is also clear that some existing health and education programs not necessarily targeted to the poor should be preserved. It is possible that the demand for these programs might go up, if for example the losses in income due to unemployment or underemployment cause people to shift from private providers and private health insurance to public programs. Still in health, some programs not targeted to the poor should be maintained because there are large externalities involved. This would be relevant for disease surveillance, immunization campaigns, malaria control, AIDS prevention, etc. Preserving access to basic (primary and lower secondary) education is not a short-term safety net issue. But as discussed earlier, it does reduce the costs of a crisis over the longer term by avoiding cuts in education spending for the poor that eventually lead to a reduction in human capital, and thereby lead to lower productivity and income.
To protect all the above programs, it will be necessary to identify some programs that can be reduced, put on hold, or eliminated. For example, some of the worse cases of misspent social spending in Latin America have come from large subsidized housing programs for the middle class, which are often mandated through earmarked taxes. While it may be impossible for a government to change these programs quickly without major legislative or even constitutional authority, in some cases the need to reallocate spending due to an emergency or a crisis may facilitate fundamental changes. Other candidates for expenditure reduction may include subsidies, such as below-cost pricing for non-poor groups for such services as electricity, water or urban transport. Better cost recovery for higher education (e.g., at the university level) and for some health care services may also help. Table 6 (whose idea came from a discussion with K. Lindert) gives a generic ranking based on common practice and observation although the priorities may change depending on the country. 
Additional implementation issues
There are several additional issues which must be considered when implementing safety nets. First, establishing new institutions that work effectively at the national level is difficult. Most social funds, for instance, take 2 to 3 years to get up and running at a level that reaches a substantial number of poor people. Under time pressure, it is much easier to work with existing institutions by providing them with support that enables them to expand their operations during a crisis. It is also often possible to expand safety nets programs that have already started on a pilot basis, and that have been evaluated and proven effective. As a corollary, it might be useful to experiment with new programs every now and then on a pilot basis, in order to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses and their ability to be expanded in case of need. Also, as indicated earlier, it may be possible to use existing institutions running programs for job training, social funds, or transfers to distribute emergency assistance when needed.
Second, not all governments possess the same capacity to administer programs. In some countries, a simple program that is not well targeted might be a better choice than a more complicated program. Safety net programs need to strike a balance between administrative capacity, fiscal sustainability, political acceptability, the scope of the intervention, and targeting efficiency. An additional problem is the relationship between the federal and provincial level governments. The staff of multilateral development banks have traditionally established a dialogue with federal authorities, but a large part of social spending takes place at the provincial level. It may be necessary to agree to additional support from the federal budget to state, provincial, or municipal budgets during a crisis if safety net programs are operated locally. However, while decentralization has a number of advantages, it is not necessarily pro-poor, so that serious monitoring of sub-national authorities is needed.
Third, one problem encountered in many countries is the proliferation of small programs throughout various parts of the government. Nutrition programs, for instance, are found in the ministries of health, education, social development and agriculture, as well as in autonomous agencies in the office of the President. Training programs are run by the ministries of education, labor, and economic development. It is important to attempt some sort of inter-ministerial coordination in order to avoid overlaps and duplication. In the longer term, it may be possible to combine or consolidate programs, and to eliminate the programs that are least effective. As mentioned earlier, a crisis can help in reorienting social budgets.
Fourth, in monitoring expenditure levels, it is in principle preferable to use actual expenditures, rather than the amounts budgeted. However, actual expenditure levels are difficult to monitor in many countries because of the long lag involved in receiving the information. By the time it is known that actual expenditures have fallen, or that the available credits have not been used, it may be too late. To avoid non-intentional budget cuts due to lags in spending, it is important after budget allocations have been made to make some efforts in order to ensure that the budgets are set operationally and maintained at adequate levels, with continuous monitoring of the outlays so that the plans are effectively being carried out.
Conclusion
Economic shocks may lead to a decline in real income caused by a loss of employment, a situation of underemployment, or a shift to a less lucrative employment. Real wages may be reduced as well by high levels of inflation. Changes in relative prices may have negative effects. The poor may also lose their access to essential public services for health, nutrition and education as a result of reduced government real spending. They may lose the value of their financial assets (however meager) if these are not protected from bankruptcy by the financial system or by the public social security system. Or they may simply have to sell these assets. In all these potential effects and in many others, the poor are more vulnerable than the non-poor because their income may fall far more quickly below bare subsistence levels.
It is common practice to recommend that governments protect key social protection programs during a crisis and expand the social safety net. However, with fiscal resources shrinking at a time when the number of poor are increasing, it may be extremely difficult to do this. Still, one would hope at least that high priority programs will be less subject to cuts than other programs. This is feasible because social safety nets represent a small part of existing budgets. Yet this does not appear to be the case at present. Rather than being countercyclical, safety nets are as pro-cyclical as other types of public expenditures, and in some cases may actually be more pro-cyclical. Ironically, social protection expenditures are not themselves protected.
Assuming that there is an agreement to protect the poor from budget cuts during a crisis, the question becomes: which programs should be protected? There are no easy answers to this question, and the answer is bound to be country specific. Still, one important criteria for the selection of the programs to protect or expand is the ability to quickly provide income support or its equivalent in kind for the poor. Workfare may help, but policy makers should be aware that it typically costs more than three dollars to generate one additional dollar in net earnings for the poor through these programs. Some nutrition and food programs may work as well provided that they are well targeted, which is not al ways the case. Good targeting is one of the key parameters of the cost effectiveness of safety nets. Also, existing social programs which are not safety nets per se (e.g., job training programs, social funds, and conditional stipends for school attendance in poor areas) can prove to be valuable delivery mechanisms for emergency assistance when there is limited administrative capacity in the country. Apart from compensating the poor from the likely loss in market-based income taking place during a crisis , it is also necessary for the government to protect some universal programs. This would include primary health care and education, as well as health programs with large externalities. But the most difficult task of all is to identify those programs that can be reduced, put on hold, or eliminated. Candidates may include subsidized housing, other subsidies for commodities not consumed mainly by the poor, some social security programs, and spending for higher education and advanced curative care. While it is often difficult politically to reform these programs, the need to act during a crisis may facilitate the necessary fundamental changes. 
